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The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative was the first greenhouse gas-focused cap-and-
trade program in the United States.  Encompassing nine states in the northeast region of the 
country, the program covers carbon dioxide emissions from large-scale fossil-based electric 
power generators. 
Over the course of the last decade, the Initiative has helped make substantial progress 
in reducing emissions and changing the generation portfolio in the region, as seen in data from 
governments, independent system operators, and RGGI itself.  It has helped to encourage the 
reduction of coal and petroleum as sources of electric generation, while encouraging the 
adoption of renewable generation, and collectively reducing emissions among RGGI states by 
over 22%, far exceeding the rest of the nation. 
While RGGI has been a major factor in emissions reduction and the shifts in the region’s 
generation portfolio, it is not likely the only reason.  Other factors, including the cost of energy, 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the potential for emissions leakage, all have had an impact 
on sources of electric generation and emissions reduction. 
Ultimately, the Initiative has been successful in its goal of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and improving the region’s generation portfolio.  While not without its drawbacks, 
including the overallocation of carbon allowances, and the potential for leakage, the program 
does have the potential for long-term improvement by expanding sector coverage and 
eliminating sources of leakage.  
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The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (also referred to here as “RGGI,” “the Program,” 
or “the Initiative”) was the first collaborative greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program 
implemented in the United States.  Currently encompassing nine states in the northeast region 
of the country, the program seeks to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the electric 
generation sector within the participating states (Bifera 2013, 1).  In order to analyze the 
program, it is first important to understand its origins and structure. 
In order to understand the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, it is helpful to 
understand the basics of a cap-and-trade system.  Cap-and-trade is an economic mechanism 
used to control the output of a given market.  In the context of emissions control, it is also 
known as an emissions trading system.  The name itself is fairly self-explanatory.  A state, 
country or multiple entities agree to place a cap on their collective emissions, gradually 
decreasing the cap over subsequent years in order to hit emissions reduction targets.  Under 
the cap, allowances for emissions (carbon or other) are allocated to participating or covered 
entities either through free distribution or auction.  The participating entities can then trade 
those allowances amongst each other in order to acquire sufficient allowances to cover their 
emissions (Bifera 2013, 1; Ramseur 2017, 2). 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative was created during the mid-2000s, beginning 
with discussions among nine states in 2003 on the potential for creating a regional emissions 
control program.  By 2005, seven of those states had signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
to join the Initiative, while three others followed suit in 2007.  When the Program took effect 
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on January 1, 2009, it officially became the first greenhouse gas-centric cap-and-trade program 
within the United States (RGGI Inc. n.d., “Program Design Archive”).   
The Initiative itself only covers carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel-powered power 
plants in the electric power sector.  Plants that are affected by RGGI are required to obtain 
sufficient carbon allowances, at auction and through trade, to cover their carbon dioxide 
emissions (RGGI, Inc. n.d., “Elements of RGGI”).   
In the second control period, from 2012-2014, the Program underwent some notable 
changes.  First, prior to the start of the control period, the State of New Jersey withdrew from 
the program, following which the emissions caps were adjusted to reflect the change.  
Secondly, in an effort to keep prices from becoming excessive due to high demand, the 
organization introduced a new price control mechanism to the auction system called the Cost 
Containment Reserve (or CCR).  The CCR was designed to release additional carbon allowances 
at a fixed price should the auction clearing price exceed a certain level, effectively creating a 
price ceiling.  The trigger price for the CCR increased annually, starting at $4 in 2014, increasing 
by $2/year until 2017 (reaching $10), 2.5%/year from 2018-2020, and rising to $13 in 2021, with 
future annual increases of 7%.  The CCR has thus far only been used twice (Bifera 2013, 3-4, 6; 
RGGI, Inc. n.d., “Allowance Prices and Volumes”; RGGI, Inc. n.d., “Elements of RGGI”).   
In 2013, the program underwent a review process that resulted in an updated model 
rule which significantly reduced the emissions cap.  In 2012 and 2013, the cap was set at 165 
million tons of carbon dioxide, slightly lower due to the lost participation of New Jersey.  In 
2014, after the new model rule took effect, the cap decreased significantly to 91 million tons of 
carbon dioxide emissions, with further annual reductions of 2.5% through 2020.  This 
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substantial change in the cap drove up auction prices from $1.93 per ton to a peak of $3.21 per 
ton during the second control period (C2ES n.d. “Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)”; 
RGGI, Inc. n.d., “Elements of RGGI”). 
The Cost Containment Reserve showed some success in keeping auction prices from 
getting too high.  However, a separate price floor mechanism did not keep the auction price 
from falling below $4 per ton.  This ultimately occurred as it had in previous control periods, 
due in part to the overallocation and subsequent banking of allowances.  RGGI allows 
participants to bank allowances indefinitely, so if the program allocated too many allowances, it 
can hinder actual emissions reduction in future years through the banking of allowances, 
decreasing demand for allowances in the auctions, and potentially driving the price down 
(Bifera 2013, 5; Ramseur 2017, 7, 9-10).   
In the third model rule for RGGI, the program will enact an additional price mechanism 
called the Emissions Containment Reserve in 2021, which allows individual states the option to 
hold back up to 10% of their allowances from auction in the event that the price falls below a 
certain level (starting at $6/ton and increasing by 7% every year thereafter), giving states the 
ability to potentially reduce emissions beyond the cap (C2ES n.d., “Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI)”; Ho & Morris 2017).  While this could help stabilize prices, it also enhances the 
program’s ability to reduce emissions. 
Now in its tenth year, RGGI has become one of the premier examples of carbon trading.   
Looking back on the first decade of RGGI, this paper will provide a comprehensive review of the 
program as it relates to its goal of emissions reduction, also examining changes to generation as 
well as implementation of renewable energy sources, ultimately highlighting three general 
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aspects of RGGI: what works; what does not; and what could be improved.  This paper will 
examine these elements of RGGI, looking at both emissions reduction and improvements in the 
regional energy portfolio, while examining its shortfalls and making recommendations for 
improvements to the program for the future. 
Methods 
 
In order to ascertain the success or failure of RGGI, multiple aspects must be examined.  
First, electric generation data for RGGI states will be examined to identify shifts in generation 
sources that may have resulted from the policy.  Second, energy-related emissions data from 
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Figure 1 (See Appendix A and Appendix B for Data)  
Data Source: U.S. EIA 2007-2018 
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effectiveness of the program in its primary objective.  Thirdly, the program itself will be 
compared to other carbon pricing systems throughout the world to examine both scope and 
effectiveness.  Finally, elements of the program will be broken out and highlighted to 
understand potential shortcomings.  
Data and Analysis 
The generation and emissions changes among RGGI states can be assessed using data 
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (henceforth referred to as “EIA”).1  In order to 
put context to generation data, and its potential implications for the region, consumption data 
must be examined.  Both generation and consumption data for the region are visually 
represented in Figure 1.  In 2005, consumption, or what EIA categorizes as “sales of electricity 
to ultimate customer,” within RGGI was 358,513 GWh, while “electric power sector” generation 
was 330,300 GWh (U.S. EIA 2007).  This discrepancy between consumption and generation of 
over 28,000 GWh was likely filled by importing electricity from neighboring states and Canadian 
provinces.  The gap between consumption and generation would continue to grow over the 
next 12 years.  Based on data from the EIA, 2017 consumption within RGGI was 336,835 GWh, 
down by 6.1% from 2005 levels, however the consumption level was mostly flat over the 
previous eight years.  Generation within RGGI states, on the other hand, decreased significantly 
to 262,872 GWh, a drop of 20.4%, leaving a gap of over 74,000 GWh between generation and 
consumption (U.S. EIA 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 
                                                     
1 2017 generation and consumption data provided by U.S. EIA is considered preliminary.  All remaining generation 
and consumption data, as well as energy-related emissions data, is considered final. 
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2018)2.  While overall generation in the region was decreasing, consumption remained 
relatively the same, meaning that RGGI states needed to import a greater amount of electricity 
in order to meet demand. 
In terms of generation, from 2005 to 2017 the participating states collectively saw a 
substantial reduction in the use of coal and petroleum for electricity generation according to 
EIA data, with the states collectively reducing their coal-based generation by 85.1% and their 
petroleum-based generation by 96.8%.  Petroleum-based generation dropped from 12.2% of 
total generation to just 0.5%, making it the least used energy source in the RGGI region.  Coal 
decreased from 22.3% of total generation to 4.2%, most of which comes from Maryland.  
Natural gas, a cleaner-burning fossil fuel, saw significant increases over the same time period, 
with generation increasing by 26% over 2005 levels.  As a result, natural gas is now the largest 
source of electric generation within RGGI, accounting for 39.7% of total generation, up from 
25% (U.S. EIA 2007-2018). 
EIA data shows that other sources of power also saw noticeable changes from 2005 to 
2017.  Nuclear power experienced a slight decrease in generation of 3.2%.  However, due to the 
rebalancing of other sources, nuclear power’s total share of generation increased by about 
6.2%, despite no added nameplate capacity in the region.  Additionally, other sources of 
generation (defined by EIA as “manufactured, supplemental gaseous fuel, propane, and waste 
gasses”)3 have experienced a noticeable decrease as a generation source since 2005.  In the 
                                                     
2 In an effort to save space and prevent an abnormally long citation, this citation will be henceforth referred to as 
“U.S. EIA 2007-2018” 
3 For purposes of this analysis, the EIA category “Other Energy Sources” has been combined with the category 
“Other Gases.” 
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intervening years, the states in RGGI have removed 20.2% of generation capacity from other 
sources to their portfolios.  While it still only accounts for 1% of total generation, it has 
surpassed petroleum in market share within RGGI (U.S. EIA 2007-2018). 
Renewables and hydroelectric generation also saw increases since 2005.  Hydroelectric 
generation saw minimal change in output, although by 2017 it accounted for 13.9% of total 
generation in RGGI, up from 10.3% in 2005 according to EIA data.  The majority of hydropower 
in RGGI is generated in the state of New York, which generates 78% of all hydropower in the 
collective.  Renewable generation experienced the largest increase among all sources used in 





















RGGI Renewable Generation - 2010-2017
Biomass Wind Solar PV
Figure 2 (See Appendix C for Data) 
Data Source: U.S. EIA 2007-2018 
 8 
hydro) increased by 149.3%, increasing its share of total generation from 2.2% to 6.9%, with 
much of the added generation coming from New England and New York.  While hydropower 
and renewables account for a comparatively modest portion of generation within RGGI, the 
collective increase from 12.5% to 20.8% is a substantial improvement, one likely to continue in 
the coming years (U.S. EIA 2007-2018). 
Looking more closely at renewable generation reveals deeper insights into the changing 
generation portfolio within RGGI.  Renewable energy comes from three sources within RGGI: 
biomass; wind power; and utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV), as can be seen in Figure 2.  Since 
2010, when the EIA began breaking out data for individual renewable sources, biomass has 
remained relatively flat, up slightly (4.2%) from 2010, although there was a noticeable dip in 
biomass-based generation from 2011-2013 (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  Biomass, however, is 
potentially controversial.  While it is technically renewable, in the sense that the plants that 
source it can regrow, biomass is burned in order to generate electricity, and that process 
releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere (NREL n.d., “Biomass Energy Basics”). 
The major sources of the increase in renewable generation come from wind and solar.  
Wind, compared to 2010, increased by 140.5% by 2017, adding more than 3500 GWh of 
generation over 2010 levels.  Most of the increase in wind came from New York and the New 
England states, although Maryland also saw a substantial increase in wind generation.  On a 
percentage basis, however, the increase in solar was unmatched.  In 2010, there was 1 GWh of 
solar PV generation in the region.  By 2017, this had increased to 1851 GWh.  Over 1200 GWh 
of solar was generated in New England, with over 1000 GWh generated in Massachusetts alone 
(U.S. EIA 2007-2018). 
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Of the three renewable sources used in the RGGI region, Biomass is the most common, 
although that is changing.  EIA data shows that in 2010, Biomass accounted for 71.6% of all 
renewable generation within RGGI.  By 2013, that amount had decreased to 55.3%.  In 2017, 
Biomass, for the first time, no longer consisted of the majority of renewable generation at 
46.9%, the plurality of renewable generation within the region.  Wind, as evidenced by its 
significant growth in output over the last 8 years, in 2017 accounted for 42.9% of total 
renewable generation (up from 28.4%), while solar increased from one tenth of one percent to 
10.3% of total renewable generation in 2017 (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  Given the pattern of growth 
Figure 3 (See Appendix D for Data)   
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of wind energy in the region, and the lack of growth of biomass, wind is likely to surpass 
biomass as the primary source of renewable energy within the region by the year 2020. 
Collectively, these changes to the generation portfolios within RGGI have facilitated a 
22.1% decrease in greenhouse gas emissions from electric generation.  This total far exceeds 
the remaining states in the nation (as shown in Figure 3), which only reduced their collective 
emissions by 10.8%, and the nation as a whole, which reduced its emissions by 11.8% (EIA 
2018a).  However, it should be noted that over that time period (2005-2015), RGGI states 
reduced total generation by 13.8%, contributing to the reduction of emissions, with the region 
seeing a 20.4% decrease in generation by 2017 (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  Emissions intensity (the 
amount of emissions per MWh of generation) also decreased during that decade, with 
emissions per MWh decreasing from 1.525 metric tons of CO2 per MWh (MT/MWh) to 1.378 
MT/MWh, down 9.6%, indicating that any new generation that came online was ultimately 
cleaner than the generation it replaced (U.S. EIA 2007-2018; 2018a).  
However, not all states within RGGI experienced similar success in improving their 
generation portfolio and reducing their emissions.   
Connecticut 
Since 2005, overall generation in the state of Connecticut has remained flat, with only a 
marginal decrease of 0.25% by 2017, while consumption decreased by 15.4%, leaving a 
generation surplus of roughly 5,200 GWh.  Connecticut’s portfolio has undergone significant 
changes since 2005, EIA data shows.  Both coal- and petroleum-based generation has decreased 
by over 95% each (95.1% and 96.3% respectively), with most of that capacity moving to natural 
gas generation, which has increased by 67.9%.  Additionally, generation from Connecticut’s 
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nuclear facilities has increased slightly, by about 6%, and the state’s renewable generation 
increased by 22.1% (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  These changes in electric power generation helped 
Connecticut reduce its emissions by over 17%, which is higher than the national average, but 
lower than the RGGI total (U.S. EIA 2018a).   
Delaware 
Delaware is one of the smallest states in the nation, both in terms of population and 
geographic footprint.  As such, it does not have a large amount of in-state power generation, as 
shown by EIA data.  However, the state made significant strides in improving its generation 
portfolio.  Since 2005, Delaware’s total electricity generation has been trending slightly upward, 
although 2017 generation levels were lower than 2005 by over 1 million megawatt hours, or 
down 14.8%.  Consumption decreased by 10%, slightly expanding the state’s generation deficit.  
Most significantly, the sources of electricity generated within the state have drastically changed 
in 12 years.  In 2005, all of Delaware’s generation was produced by fossil fuels, with nearly two-
thirds generated by coal.  By 2017, the state had managed to reduce its reliance on coal to less 
than 6%, while nearly eliminating petroleum-based generation.  While still heavily reliant on 
fossil generation, 92.4% of the state’s generation portfolio is now powered by cleaner natural 
gas, and the state has added over 100,000 megawatt hours of renewable generation to its 
portfolio (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  This has helped the state reduce its emissions by 23%, slightly 
ahead of the RGGI total (U.S. EIA 2018a). 
Maine 
Maine is one of two RGGI states where renewables (including hydroelectricity) power 
the majority of its generation portfolio, according to data from the EIA.  In 2005, the majority of 
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the state’s generation (51.3%) came from natural gas, while 39.6% came from hydro and 
renewables combined.  Over the last 12 years, Maine has substantially reduced its reliance on 
coal and petroleum for generation, with each now accounting for less than two percent of total 
generation.  Additionally, generation from natural gas was cut by 76%, and natural gas now 
accounts for about 19% of the state’s generation portfolio.  Maine has also significantly 
increased its generation from non-hydro renewable sources, nearly doubling the electricity 
generated by renewable sources, increasing renewable generation from 14.6% to 44.1% of the 
state’s generation.  Combined with hydroelectricity, renewables account for 77.1% of the 
state’s portfolio.  However, the large renewable footprint results in part from a substantial 
reduction in overall generation in the state (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  Overall generation within the 
state decreased by 35.3%, while consumption declined by only 7.7%, with a slight generation 
surplus in 2005 becoming a generation deficit of over 2,400 GWh, requiring imported 
generation to cover the difference.  Over two thirds of the lost fossil generation was not 
replaced with new in-state generation, instead being imported from Canada (U.S. EIA 2007-
2018; ISO-NE n.d., “Resource Mix”; National Energy Board 2018b).  These changes to the state’s 
energy portfolio have helped reduce the state’s emissions by 27.3%, the third highest 
improvement within RGGI (U.S. EIA 2018a). 
Maryland 
Maryland generates the second highest amount of electricity of the current RGGI states, 
behind only New York, according to EIA data.  Like most RGGI states, Maryland saw a 
substantial reduction in the amount of electricity generated by its power plants, decreasing 
power generated by over one third from 2005 to 2017.  At the same time, the state only saw a 
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13.4% decrease in consumption, resulting in a 58% increase in the state’s generation deficit 
from 16,346 GWh to 25,823 GWh, requiring increased imports.  During that period, the state 
saw a substantial shift in its generation portfolio.  In 2005, the majority of electricity generated 
in Maryland came from coal plants (55.8%), with nuclear being the second largest source, 
accounting for 28.3% of the state’s generation, and other sources accounting for the rest, with 
only petroleum accounting for more than five percent (7.2%).  By 2017, the state had 
substantially reduced its fossil fuel generation.  Coal generation over that time decreased by 
71%, while petroleum has nearly disappeared, accounting for only one third of a percent of the 
state’s generation portfolio.  Offsetting some of those losses, the state dramatically increased 
its generation from natural gas, increasing output from the source by 237%.  The state also saw 
a significant increase in renewable generation, increasing by 233.2%.  Maryland even saw a 
slight increase from its Calvert Cliffs nuclear facility, which became the largest source of power 
generation in the state, accounting for 45.3% of total generation (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  The 
substantial reductions and shifts in Maryland’s energy portfolio have helped the state reduce 
emissions by 28.7%, well ahead of the nation, and the second highest improvement among the 
RGGI states (U.S. EIA 2018a). 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts is an interesting case study, in that it reduced its emissions almost 
entirely through fossil reduction than through additions in renewable generation, as shown in 
EIA data reports.  In 2005. fossil-based sources accounted for 82.7% of the electricity generated 
in the state, over half of which was natural gas.  Since then, use of coal and petroleum 
generation in the state has been drastically reduced, by 90.5% and 96.7% respectively, to the 
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point where they collectively account for less than 5% of the total generation in the state.  
While there was minimal increase in natural gas-based generation, due to portfolio rebalancing 
it now accounts for 67.3% of total generation, as the state did not add sufficient renewables to 
its portfolio to replace the lost fossil generation.  Renewable generation nearly doubled during 
that timeframe, a substantial improvement, but behind other RGGI states on a percentage-
basis.  Total generation in the state decreased by 34.3% during this period, while consumption 
remained relatively flat, trending downward despite a noticeable increase in consumption from 
2016 to 2017, ultimately widening the generation deficit within the state, requiring more 
imported electricity.  (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  Through their substantial reduction in fossil-based 
generation, Massachusetts managed to reduce its emissions by 22.4%, slightly ahead of the 
RGGI total and well ahead of the rest of the nation (U.S. EIA 2018a). 
New Hampshire 
Like several other RGGI states, New Hampshire was heavily reliant on fossil generation 
prior to the program’s start according to EIA data, with fossils combining to collectively 
generate just under half of the state’s portfolio (49.7%).  However, it is one of only a few RGGI 
states to maintain a heavy reliance on nuclear generation.  In both 2005 and 2017, nuclear was 
the largest source of electric generation within the state.  New Hampshire’s generators have 
substantially reduced their use of fossil fuels, reducing the use of coal and petroleum by almost 
93% each (down to about 1.7% and 0.5% respectively), and even reducing the use of natural gas 
by almost half (about 46.5%).  As a result, combined with a nearly 6% increase in nuclear 
output, nuclear power in 2017 accounted for 57.4% of total generation within the state (up 
from 39.3%), while natural gas accounted for 20.4%, down from 27.5% of total generation, and 
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hydroelectricity accounted for about 7.4% of the state’s portfolio in both 2005 and 2017.  The 
state also saw a significant increase in renewable generation, more than doubling output 
between 2005 and 2017 (up 162.8%), making non-hydro renewables currently the third largest 
source of generation in the state, at about 12.4%.  Total generation in New Hampshire 
decreased by 27.8% from 2005 to 2017, while consumption also decreased by about 500 GWh 
to 10,750 GWh, resulting in a nearly 50% reduction in the state’s generation surplus (U.S. EIA 
2007-2018).  These changes to the state’s generation portfolio resulted in New Hampshire 
decreasing its energy-related emissions by 29.1%, well above the rest of the country, and the 
highest emissions reduction among all RGGI states (U.S. EIA 2018a). 
New York 
New York State holds the distinction of having the lowest energy use per capita of any 
state in the nation, at 189M BTUs per capita in 2015 (U.S. EIA n.d.).  This is reflected in both the 
state’s energy portfolio data and its annualized emissions data.  From 2005 to 2017, New York 
reduced its total power generation by nearly 13.1%, according to data from the EIA, while 
consumption only decreased slightly, resulting the state’s generation deficit more than tripling, 
increasing import requirements.  More importantly, however, the state dramatically reduced its 
use of less efficient fossil fuel generation, decreasing coal- and petroleum-based power 
generation by over 97% each, replacing much of that generation with cleaner-burning natural 
gas and environmentally friendly renewable energy (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  Over the same time 
period, New York increased natural gas generation by 51.1%.  Most significantly, the state 
increased its generation from non-hydro renewable sources by 271.2%.  While non-hydro 
renewables only account for about 5% of total generation in the state, the increase over that 
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time period is still significant.  The state now generates almost 94% of its electricity through 
natural gas, nuclear and hydro.  This is a substantial increase for these three sources from 2005, 
when they combined to account for only about 68% of total generation (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  
This shift in generating capacity from older fossil sources to newer and cleaner sources resulted 
in a decrease in emissions of 20.5% from 2005 to 2015 (U.S. EIA 2018a). 
Rhode Island 
Rhode Island, like Delaware, has a small geographic footprint, and similarly does not 
generate much electricity within its borders according to EIA data, and the electricity it does 
generate almost entirely comes from cleaner sources.  In 2005, 99.8% of electricity generated in 
Rhode Island came from natural gas plants, with the rest generated by petroleum.  Because 
natural gas is a cleaner source than other fossil fuels, all of Rhode Island’s subsequent 
improvement came from increasing renewable generation.  By 2017, the state had added 
369,000 megawatt hours of renewable generation, now accounting for over 7% of total 
generation in the state.  Generation from petroleum sources remains minimal, accounting for 
less than one percent of total generation.  The remaining amount, 92%, continues to be 
generated from natural gas, with overall generation decreasing by 13.3% since 2005.  Similar to 
Delaware, the state consumes more electricity than it generates, by over 2,000 GWh, requiring 
imports from neighboring states (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  While Rhode Island substantially 
increased its renewable generation during that time period, the state did not substantially 
reduce its emissions from 2005 to 2015, in part because the vast majority of the state’s 
generation portfolio continues to be derived from natural gas.  Over the course of the decade, 
the state managed to reduce energy related emissions by only 2.68%, by far the smallest 
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improvement among RGGI states (U.S. EIA 2018a).  While Rhode Island’s emissions reduction 
was minor, the state’s energy portfolio is clearly headed in the direction of increased 
renewables. 
Vermont 
Vermont is the other state where renewables (including hydro) account for the majority 
of the state’s energy portfolio, according to the EIA.  Vermont’s use of renewables is so 
pervasive that it accounts for almost 100% of the electricity generated within the state, with a 
small amount coming from petroleum and natural gas (U.S. EIA 2018).  In 2005, the state 
generated the majority of its electricity by nuclear power from the since shuttered Vermont 
Yankee plant (U.S. EIA 2007; ISO-NE n.d., “Resource Mix”).  While Vermont is now virtually all 
renewable, it was able to achieve that feat by reducing its total generation by over 60% from 
2005.  As such, consumption now vastly outpaced generation within the state (5,392 GWh vs. 
2,073 GWh), requiring the state to import the majority of its energy needs from bordering 
states and Canadian provinces, both of which have substantial hydroelectric and renewable 
generation (ISO-NE “Resource Mix”; National Energy Board 2018C; U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  During 
that time, the state was able to more than double its generation from non-hydro renewables, 
now accounting for 41.3% of total generation (up from 7.3%), with most of the remainder 
coming from hydropower (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  In 2005 and 2015, Vermont was the lowest 
emitting state in RGGI.  These changes helped the state reduce emissions by 10.3%, despite 
limited room for improvement (U.S. EIA 2018a). 
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New Jersey 
One interesting point of comparison is a state that left RGGI after only a few years.  New 
Jersey was a founding member of the Initiative and was a major participant during its first few 
years.  However, in 2011, then-Governor Chris Christie, a Republican, unilaterally decided to 
remove the state from RGGI (Bifera 2013, 3).  In early 2018, current Governor Phil Murphy, a 
progressive Democrat, issued a memorandum to begin the process of rejoining RGGI (McKenna 
2018).  While New Jersey has not yet rejoined the Initiative, because it was a member for 
several years, the state’s data remains relevant with respect to RGGI, and will be examined 
despite its fluctuating status. 
As New Jersey exited the Initiative early, its progress in lowering emissions and 
improving its energy portfolio was understandably stunted.  From 2005 to 2015, New Jersey 
reduced its emissions by just over 14%, according to the EIA.  This amount is slightly ahead of 
the national average of just under 12%, although it falls short of the RGGI combined 
greenhouse gas reduction of 22.1% (EIA 2018a).  However, the state made notable progress in 
changing the state’s energy portfolio.  From 2005 to 2017, New Jersey reduced its coal 
generation, which previously accounted for nearly 20% of the state’s generation, by nearly 90%.  
The state also increased its natural gas generation by nearly 150%, which combined with 
nuclear generation, accounts for nearly 95% of the state’s energy generation.  However, the 
state’s total generation increased by over 23% from 2005 to 2017, the opposite of the trend 
seen in RGGI states.  Additionally, the state’s renewable sector remains fairly small, accounting 
for less than 2.5% of total generation, although it has been increasing, and the likely 
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recommitment to RGGI bodes well for the future of renewables in the state (U.S. EIA 2007-
2018). 
Comparisons 
While the RGGI states compared favorably to the remainder of the nation, it is also 
useful to examine how the program compares to other emissions control programs elsewhere 
in the world.  Two examples that provide useful comparisons of emissions reduction to RGGI 
are the European Union Emissions Trading System and the British Columbia Carbon Tax. 
European Union Emissions Trading System 
The European Union’s Emissions Trading System was the world’s first major cap-and-
trade system for greenhouse gas emissions.  Created in part to comply with Europe’s 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU ETS began operation in 2005.  It currently 
encompasses 31 countries, and in addition to carbon dioxide, also covers emissions of nitrous 
oxide and perfluorocarbons.  The program has emissions goals of 21% reduction in emissions 
from covered sectors (except aviation) by 2020 (over 2005 levels), and a goal of 43% emissions 
reduction by 2030 (over 2005 levels) (European Commission 2016; Brown et al. 2012, 4-5). 
Over the last 13 years, the EU ETS has evolved to become one of the most 
comprehensive carbon control programs in the world.  While the EU ETS started with limited 
sector involvement, it has since expanded to cover additional sectors and subsectors, including 
the aviation sector.  Additionally, the program adapted its allocation system to combat 
overallocation and market volatility, gradually incorporating an auction-based allocation 
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system, and adding allowance banking and borrowing across program phases.  (European 
Commission 2016; Brown et al. 2012). 
The EU Emissions Trading System generated emissions reductions on par to those of 
RGGI.  Nominally, the EU reduced its emissions by 10.5% from 2005 to 2015, using only the 
emissions covered for each year.  However, when adjusting for the addition of new industrial 
and transportation sources, and incorporating those emissions into totals for all years, the EU 
reduced its emissions by 24%, slightly ahead of RGGI over the same time period (European 
Environment Agency 2017). 
British Columbia Carbon Tax 
Cap-and-trade programs are not the only policy method for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.  The same effect can also be achieved by using a carbon tax.  While a cap-and-trade 
system creates a hard carbon target, allowing participants to buy, sell, or trade allowances to 
get under the limit, a carbon tax sets a hard price for carbon, with both reducing emissions by 
increasing the marginal cost of emitting (Frank 2014).  One such example is in British Columbia, 
Canada.  In 2008, the provincial government implemented a carbon tax policy, covering 70% of 
all greenhouse gases emitted within the province, with the caveat that the funds raised through 
the tax would be returned to the people in the form of reduced taxes, making the system 
revenue neutral (Province of British Columbia n.d.).   
The carbon tax program has had some success in reducing emissions, although it has not 
experienced the same level of success at reducing greenhouse gas emissions as the larger RGGI 
and EU Emissions Trading System.  British Columbia generates the vast majority of its electricity 
through renewable sources, particularly hydroelectricity, and as a result, power generation in 
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the province only accounts for 1-2% of its total greenhouse gas emissions (Province of British 
Columbia 2017; National Energy Board 2018a).  When looking across all sectors, over the same 
time period of 2005-2015, British Columbia only reduced its carbon emissions by around 5%.  
Interestingly, if the emissions reduction was calculated from the year of the carbon tax’s 
inception, then economy-wide emissions reduction declines to 2.1% (Province of British 
Columbia 2017).   
Starting out at $10 CDN per metric ton, the carbon tax gradually increased over its first 
few years, reaching its current level of $30 CDN per metric ton (Province of British Columbia 
n.d.).  Compared to the auction prices in the EU and RGGI, this amount initially appears 
noticeably higher.  However, when adjusted for currency and metric conversion, the carbon 
prices are closer.  Using the currency conversion rate on April 29, 2018, the carbon tax is equal 
to $23.39 USD per metric ton (XE.com 2018).  Adjusting for the difference between metric tons 
and short tons, the tax comes out to an equivalent of $21.22 USD per short ton.  This amount is 
vastly higher than current auction prices in RGGI and is nearly three times the peak price of 
$7.50 (RGGI, Inc. n.d., “Allowance Prices and Volumes”).  However, the auction prices in the EU 
ETS are generally higher than they are in RGGI, with an average auction price for April 2018 of 
€13.224 (EEX 2018), which converts to $16.04 USD5 (XE.com 2018a).  When adjusted for short 
tons, the price is $14.55 per short ton, meaning that the EU auction prices roughly split the 
difference between the RGGI auction and the British Columbia carbon tax.  One would think 
that the higher cost of carbon would result in lower emissions.  However, given the tax’s 
                                                     
4 As of April 29, 2018. 
5 Using currency conversion rate on April 29, 2018. 
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revenue-neutral nature, it is possible that the resulting lower taxes may be having a 
counteracting effect on the tax itself. 
One major strength that BC’s carbon tax has over RGGI is that it encompasses a broader 
cross-section of the economy, in part by focusing on fuels rather than generation.  RGGI, as 
noted earlier, only covers power generation, and while the European Union system is broader 
(covering 45% of greenhouse gas emissions), they do not currently cover the same scope of 
emissions as BC’s system (European Commission 2016; RGGI, Inc. n.d., “Elements of RGGI”).  
California’s newer emissions trading system, which works in tandem with other Canadian 
provinces, covers 85% of all greenhouse gas emissions in the state (C2ES n.d., “California Cap 
and Trade”).  However, the carbon tax has one major flaw in its design.  Because there is no 
associated cap, emissions under a carbon tax can vary more from year to year, which can 
become problematic if a municipality is trying to reach a specific goal (Frank 2014). 
External Factors 
While the goal of RGGI has been to reduce greenhouse gas emissions among the 
member states, there are a few additional factors that likely had an effect on emissions 
reduction and the changes in the region’s generation portfolio. 
Cost of Energy 
The cost of energy is an important factor in deciding what kind of generation to 
implement in an area.  The unsubsidized costs in the United States, over the last decade, have 
been increasingly favoring renewables and more efficient forms of energy generation, 
according to Lazard, which annually release a report on the levelized cost of energy.  In 2009, 
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utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) was prohibitively expensive at over $350/MWh.  The 
remaining forms of energy cost between $80 and $140/MWh, with wind being the highest 
among those at $135/MWh, and natural gas combined cycle being the lowest at $83/MWh.  By 
2017, the cost landscape had radically changed.  The costs of wind and solar PV energy had 
fallen so significantly that they surpassed natural gas as having the two lowest levelized costs of 
energy at $45 and $50/MWh respectively, although natural gas was not far behind at 
$60/MWh.  This cluster of wind, solar and natural gas at lower price point makes them 
comparatively more palatable to electric utilities and generators than coal, which costs 70% 
more per MWh than natural gas, and nuclear, which at $148/MWh might require government 
subsidies simply to keep existing plants open (Lazard 2017, 2-3; 2017a).  It should be noted, 
however, that energy prices in the northeastern United States tend to be higher than the nation 
as a whole, with all states in RGGI having higher electricity prices in 2017 that the national 
average, ranging from $10.99 to $17.62 per KWh compared to the national average of $10.54 
per KWh (U.S. EIA 2018).  Offshore wind, which several RGGI states are considering, is priced 
separately by Lazard from land-based wind turbines, having a higher levelized cost at 
$113/MWh, which could be made more palatable to utilities through subsidies (Lazard 2017, 2-
3). 
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
RGGI is limited in its coverage of generation sources, only requiring fossil-fuel 
generators with a nameplate capacity of 25MW or greater to purchase carbon allowances to 
cover their emissions.  Renewables are not required to purchase carbon allowances, as they 
emit no carbon dioxide.  Along the same lines, in its effort to reduce emissions, RGGI has no 
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specific requirement regarding the implementation of renewable sources (Bifera 2013, 5-7; 
RGGI, Inc. n.d., “Elements of RGGI”).  While cleaner sources like renewables are likely to be 
adopted by states when facing a carbon cap, if there is no specific requirement, it would 
hypothetically make the most sense for utilities to use the lowest cost option.   
Instead, many states, including all RGGI states, have Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
which are designed to spur investment in renewable generation within the state, with set goals 
for increasing renewables in the state’s portfolio.  A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), also 
known as a Renewable Electricity Standard, is a state-level program setting mandatory (or in 
some cases, voluntary) renewable generation goals within the state, often with carve-outs for 
specific forms of renewable generation like solar or offshore wind.  It is this mandate that 
makes the RPS a more likely instigator of investment and development of renewable generation 
with the RGGI states.  Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) are often used in RPS programs for 
trade and compliance purposes.  A REC is created to certify the generation of a specific amount 
of renewable energy, and these RECs can also be traded among entities.  However, many RPS 
programs offer alternative mechanisms to comply with the mandate, including offsets and 
alternative compliance payments, potentially reducing the overall impact of the RPS (NREL n.d., 
“Renewable Portfolio Standards”; U.S. EPA 2015; DSIRE 2017c; Durkay 2017). 
While all of the states participating in RGGI have an RPS program in place, many of them 
have very ambitious renewable goals.  Overall, the RPS programs in RGGI have renewable goals 
varying from 15% to 50%, with target dates ranging from 2017 to 2035.  Most programs have 
carveout requirements for specific forms of renewable generation (such as solar or offshore 
wind), and most incorporate RECs as a compliance mechanism, while all have alternative 
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compliance payment mechanisms.  Vermont has the most ambitious RPS in RGGI, with goals of 
55% renewables by 2017 (which they achieved, as noted above), increasing to 75% by 2032.  
New York also has an incredibly ambitious RPS, given its size, with a goal of 50% renewables by 
the year 2030.  Maine and Rhode Island both have high RPS goals, with Maine reaching their 
RPS goal of 40% by 2017, and Rhode Island aiming for 38.5% renewables by 2035, the latest 
target date in the region.  Massachusetts has an escalating goal of an additional 1% per year 
after it reaches its primary goal of 20.5% by 2020.  In 2017, Maryland’s state legislature passed 
legislation to strengthen the state’s RPS program, increasing the goal to 25%, while moving the 
goal up to 2020, while simultaneously adding a carve-out for offshore wind, in addition to the 
program’s pre-existing carve-out for solar.  The remaining three states (Connecticut, Delaware, 
and New Hampshire) have set similar RPS goals, with Connecticut targeting 28% renewables by 
2020, Delaware targeting 25% by 2025-2026, and New Hampshire targeting 25.2% by 2025, 
with each containing carveouts for specific technologies (DSIRE 2016; 2016a; 2017; 2017a; 
2017b; 2017c; 2017d; 2017e; 2017f). 
Emissions Leakage 
Emissions leakage is one of the major flaws of the program.  As observed in EIA data, 
most of the RGGI states decreased their total in-state generation from 2005 to 2017.  However, 
consumption of electricity has changed little and remains higher than total generation within 
the region, meaning more electricity is being imported from out-of-state (U.S. EIA 2007-2018).  
Consider the example of the New England states.  All RGGI members, together they form the 
service area for a single independent system operator, ISO New England.  From 2005 to 2015, 
the region reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by nearly 21%, far exceeding most other states 
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and the nation as a whole (U.S. EIA 2018a).  New England did this, in part, by making major 
changes to its generation portfolio, increasing renewable generation, and switching from coal 
and petroleum to cleaner sources.  From 2005 to 2017, New England states reduced generation 
from coal and petroleum by over 90% each (91.7% and 95.1% respectively), while more than 
doubling renewable generation within the region (up 103.5%) (U.S. EIA 2007-2018). 
However, the changes to the region’s energy portfolio resulted in a noticeable decrease 
in the amount of electricity generated within the states.  In 2005, according to ISO New 
England, the New England states collectively generated 131,877 GWh of electricity.  By 2017, 
that amount had dropped 22.3% to 102,534 GWh (ISO-NE n.d. “Resource Mix’; ISO-NE 2017).  
ISO New England also noted that energy consumption within the region was declining, dropping 
to 121,061 GWh in 2017 from a peak of 136,355 GWh in 2005, a decline of 11.2% (ISO-NE n.d., 
“Electricity Use”).  This discrepancy meant that New England was importing electricity from 
elsewhere to meet their total energy demand.   
According to ISO New England, in 2017, the System Operator imported 20,243 GWh of 
electricity from neighboring regions, a total of 16.7% of energy consumed.  This included 1,536 
GWh from New York.  However, most of their imported power originated from Canada (ISO-NE 
n.d. “Resource Mix”).  Maine received 4,306 GWh from New Brunswick, while the vast majority 
of the imports, 14,401 GWh, came from the province of Quebec (ISO-NE n.d., “Resource Mix”; 
National Energy Board 2018b). 
This is where the program flaw exists.  Imports are not covered sources under RGGI, just 
fossil generation within participating states’ borders.  This is potentially a giant loophole in the 
program, and as participating states decrease their fossil generation, they are increasingly 
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relying on imported generation (Ramseur 2017, 14; Tietenberg 2013, 319-320; RGGI, Inc. 2016, 
10-11).  In the case of New England, the vast majority of their imported generation is likely 
renewable.  Both New York and Quebec are heavily reliant on Hydroelectricity and other 
renewable sources, with hydro accounting for 22.7% in New York and 95% in Quebec, and other 
renewables accounting for 4.8% in New York and 4% in Quebec (U.S. EIA 2018; National Energy 
Board 2018c).  Both of these regions also participate in greenhouse gas cap-and-trade 
programs, with New York being a founding member of RGGI, and Quebec having their own 
program, which is linked to California’s new program (RGGI, Inc. n.d., “Program Design 
Archive”; C2ES n.d., “California Cap and Trade”).   
New Brunswick, however, is a different story.  While imports from the province are 
minimal, and only apply to one state, their energy portfolio is not nearly as clean as its 
neighboring states and provinces.  While roughly 30% percent of New Brunswick’s generation 
comes from hydro and renewable sources (including wind and biomass), and another 30% 
comes from nuclear generation, the remaining 40% comes from older fossil sources (National 
Energy Board 2018b).  This is a problem, because it makes it more difficult to trace the source 
of the imported energy.  When a state or province is generating 90%+ of their power from 
renewables, tracing the source is a much more clear-cut task.   
Using overall emissions intensity, combined with generation totals, will provide a total 
emissions footprint.  Accordingly, the emissions intensity associated from New Brunswick 
imports fluctuated wildly from 2005 to 2012, before leveling off at 639 lbs. CO2/MWh (or 
0.3195 short tons/MWh) in 2013 and 2014.  Assuming similar numbers in 2017, then the 4,306 
GWh in imported generation from New Brunswick would result in 1,375,767 tons CO2/MWh.  
 28 
Comparatively, Quebec had an emissions intensity of 4 lbs. CO2/MWh (or 0.002 short 
tons/MWh) in 2013 and 2014.  When applied to its 2017 imports of 14,401 GWh, total carbon  
emissions from Quebec equal only 28,802 tons CO2/MWh, just over one fifth of the emissions 
footprint of New Brunswick, despite exporting more than three times the amount of electricity 
to the RGGI region. (RGGI, Inc. 2016, 15). 
The issue of emissions leakage is prevalent throughout the RGGI region.  The chart in 
Figure 4 shows combined 2005-2014 CO2 emissions of the RGGI states including emissions from 
in-state generation as well as those from imported generation according to data compiled by 
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Figure 4 (See Appendix E for Data)  
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timeframe by 27.5%.  Emissions from RGGI-affected units clearly and substantially decreased 
over the decade, decreasing by 44.5% from 2005 to 2014.  However, emissions from other, 
non-affected sources have not changed nearly as significantly.  Emissions from imported 
sources only decreased by 6.9% over that time period, and due to the substantial reduction 
from RGGI-affected sources, imported emissions account for a larger percentage of total 
emissions, up to 18.4% from 14.3% (RGGI, Inc. 2016, 15).   
The remaining states within RGGI have potentially larger issues with emissions leakage 
due to imports from the neighboring PJM independent system operator.  New York imports 
generation from Ontario, Quebec and PJM states (given the proximity, most likely Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey).  In 2014, the state imported 7,180,281 MWh of generation from Ontario, 
8,839,775 MWh from Quebec, and 8,239,526 MWh of generation from PJM.  Over the decade, 
imports from Ontario and Quebec trended upward while imports from PJM maintained a 
relatively flat trend.  Although the imports are similar in amount, their carbon footprints are 
vastly different due to the emissions intensity of generation from each region.  Ontario 
generation has an emissions intensity of 168 lbs. CO2/MWh (or 0.084 tons/MWh) and Quebec 
has a previously mentioned intensity of 4 lbs. CO2/MWh, while PJM generation imported into 
New York has a substantially higher emissions intensity of 1,101 lbs. CO2/MWh (or 0.5505 
tons/MWh).  As a result, PJM imports to New York produce 4,534,250 tons of CO2 while 
Ontario and Quebec imports only produce 603,144 tons and 19,488 tons of CO2 respectively, 
each a fraction of the emissions from PJM, which alone accounted for 3.4% of total RGGI 
emissions in 2014 (RGGI, Inc. 2016, 15, 32-33). 
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Maryland and Delaware import all of their outside generation from PJM, and as such, 
their exposure to emissions leakage is much more substantial.  In 2014, the two states (which 
are members of both RGGI and PJM) imported a total of 32,656,507 MWh of generation from 
other states in PJM (likely Pennsylvania, New Jersey and West Virginia).6  While it is a negligible 
increase over 2005, imports from PJM were trending upward over the decade.  Given the 
previously mentioned emissions intensity, imports from other PJM states produced 17,971,031 
tons of CO2, an amount greater than the emissions from all other imports into the RGGI region 
combined.  As can be seen in Figure 4, while RGGI-affected emissions decreased substantially 
over the decade, PJM to PJM imports remained fairly consistent, and clearly make up an 
increasingly sizable percentage of emissions.  Just these imports alone produce 13.6% of the 
CO2 emissions in the RGGI region, the second largest amount in RGGI (RGGI, Inc. 2016, 15). 
Success or Failure? 
Successes 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative overall has seen some success in improving 
emissions and reducing the region’s reliance on fossil fuels for electricity generation.  Overall 
the participating states exceed the nation in terms of emissions reduction, and was on par with 
other emissions control programs, specifically the EU Emissions Trading System.  While many of 
the factors that might have affected RGGI’s emissions reduction, such as the cost of energy and 
renewable portfolio standards, were present elsewhere in the nation, the RGGI states 
                                                     
6 The RGGI Monitoring Report does not separate imports by Maryland and Delaware, categorizing them 
collectively as “RGGI PJM.” 
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collectively managed to exceed the nation in emissions reduction, despite running behind the 
nation in implementing renewable energy (U.S. EIA 2007-2018; 2018a).  
One of the major successes of RGGI is that it has generated substantial economic benefit 
for the region.  In a report released in April 2018, Analysis Group found that during RGGI’s third 
control period, from 2015 to 2017, the program generated a net economic advantage of $1.4 
Billion for the region, while creating 14,500 job-years (one job over a 12-month period) 
(Hibbard et al. 2018, 4, 8-9).  This economic benefit was generated primarily by allowance 
auction revenues, which the states use to fund programs that further the goals of RGGI, 
including energy efficiency programs and carbon sequestration projects (Hibbard et al. 2018, 4-
5; RGGI, Inc. n.d. “About Auctions”).  Roughly $1 Billion in revenue was generated from 
allowance auctions during the third control period, with a total of almost $2.8 Billion in revenue 
since 2009, when the program began (Hibbard et al. 2018, 2, 4). 
As noted earlier, the Initiative also contributed to substantial changes in the region’s 
energy portfolio.  Capping the emissions carbon dioxide, combined with the decreasing price of 
renewables and mandated renewable generation goals, RGGI helped to usher in noticeable 
increases in renewable generation within the region.  Additionally, RGGI’s policies helped to 
foster a major shift from older fossil generation, such as coal and petroleum, to more efficient 
natural gas-based generation (RGGI, Inc. “Elements of RGGI”; U.S. EIA 2007-2018; Lazard 2017a; 
NREL n.d. “Renewable Portfolio Standards”).  While RPS were likely the primary initiator of 
increases in renewable generation, given that renewable energy sources account for a smaller 
percentage of generation than the nation as a whole (U.S. EIA 2007-2018), it is likely that RGGI 
is a primary instigator of the generation changes and emissions reduction within the region. 
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Failures 
While the Initiative was generally a success, it was not without its failures.  As noted 
earlier, the decrease in generation within the region is creating an increasing disparity with 
consumption within the region, requiring more imported electricity, and leaving the program 
vulnerable to emissions leakage (U.S. EIA 2007-2018; RGGI, Inc. 2016, 15).  
The surplus of allowances is a significant flaw in RGGI’s design. This flaw occurred when 
RGGI overallocated the amount of carbon allowances in early auctions.  A number of factors, 
including lower demand and a shifting portfolio resulted an excess of allowances being 
allocated.  Carbon allowances in RGGI do not expire, so participating entities can hold on to 
them indefinitely.  Entities could then go on to “bank” their allowances and use them for later 
years when they might have otherwise fallen short, effectively reducing the overall emissions 
improvement (Bifera 2013, 5; Ramseur 2017, 8-10).   
Despite the initial surplus, allowance banking is not necessarily a flaw itself.  While a 
banking system could result in a surplus of allowances, potentially affecting overall emissions, 
allowing banking of carbon allowances provides greater flexibility for the participants in terms 
of planning for future years or in the event of a poor year emissions-wise.  For example, when 
the EU Emissions Trading System added cross-phase banking, it helped to stabilize the auction 
price of carbon allowances. (Brown et al. 2012, 17-19). 
The banking of allowances across compliance periods could potentially be useful, 
encouraging participating entities to take corrective action now, and bank allowances for later 
years when the cap’s lower allowance supply results in higher prices.  However, banking is 
ideally combined with a robust cap (Brown et al. 2012, 17-19).  In the early years of RGGI, the 
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cap was set between 165 million tons and 188 million tons of CO2, and for several auctions 
during that period, the clearing price for allowances fell to the price floor and not all allowances 
were sold.  However, RGGI did ultimately take corrective actions under the second model rule.  
When the cap was reduced to 91 million in 2014, the substantial reduction helped to offset the 
outstanding allowance surplus, and the lower supply caused the clearing price for allowances to 
increase significantly as high $7.50 in the third control period.  Although the price has since 
fallen to near $3.00, it has not fallen to the price floor level since, and all allowances were sold 
at recent auctions (Ramseur 2017, 10-11). 
In these highly partisan times, particularly regarding issues pertaining to the 
environment and climate change, there is the potential for government apathy, whereby a 
legislature or governor lacks interest in the program and its goals, potentially resulting in 
scenarios where states join and leave depending on the political parties in power.  The prime 
example of this is the state of New Jersey, which as noted above, was pulled out of RGGI by 
Governor Chris Christie for likely-partisan reasons (Bifera 2013, 3).  Although they are now in 
the process of rejoining (McKenna 2018), the ability of a state to remove itself from the 
initiative should not be so simple.  This is a flaw that could easily be addressed by updating the 
governing documents, requiring states to codify their emissions programs through legislation 
rather than regulation (which are both currently acceptable under RGGI) (RGGI, Inc. n.d. 
“Elements of RGGI”), and subsequently requiring states to get approval from both the 
legislature and executive before they can leave the Program. 
Finally, biomass is a potential problem for RGGI due to its debatable status as a 
renewable.  The federal government considers biomass to be a renewable source of energy, 
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and it subsequently is not covered by RGGI (U.S. EIA 2018; RGGI, Inc. n.d. “Elements of RGGI”).  
However, as noted earlier, biomass is burned in order to generate electricity, emitting carbon 
dioxide and other potential pollutants in the process.  The theory is that the replanted feed 
stock (trees or plants), will absorb enough carbon dioxide to fully offset the emissions from 
burning biomass.  While grass and smaller plants can regrow fairly quickly, trees can take 
decades to regrow, meaning that those carbon emissions might not be fully offset for several 
years, all while additional biomass is being burned (NREL n.d. “Biomass Energy Basics”).  Since 
biomass is currently the most prominent source of renewable energy within RGGI (U.S. EIA 
2018), this could be a problem.  As such, both RGGI and the federal government should 
consider the long-term recategorization of biomass as a renewable, removing select sources of 
biomass from the category and updating future Initiative model rules to reflect this.  
Potential Improvements 
There are a few potential improvements that could be made to RGGI in an effort to 
strengthen the program and ultimately improve emissions reduction.  First, RGGI states should 
consider expanding the Initiative’s coverage beyond large-scale fossil generation.  Since RGGI’s 
founding, other programs, including the EU ETS, the BC carbon tax, and California’s new 
emissions trading system, have incorporated sectors outside of simple electric generation 
(European Commission 2016; Province of British Columbia n.d.; C2ES “California Cap and 
Trade”).  Incorporating emissions from industrial facilities (and possibly commercial facilities) 
would be a good place to start, as industrial emissions are now covered by all three of the 
aforementioned programs.  Implementing a method to cover the transportation sector, while 
more difficult, would be an admirable change to the program.  Expanding coverage would bring 
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the Program in line with its peers, and ultimately further decrease greenhouse gas emissions 
within the region. 
Second, emissions leakage is a potential problem within RGGI, and creating a 
compliance mechanism to account for those emissions would minimize or eliminate one of the 
more prominent shortcomings of the program.  This is not an easy task, as it involves both 
interstate and international electricity flow, and could potentially be a trade issue, resulting in 
litigation or the involvement of the World Trade Organization (Tietenberg 2013, 319-320).  To 
limit this exposure, requiring the electric utilities that import generation from outside the 
region to account for and have allowances for the carbon emissions of those imports would be 
a potential starting point, while requiring all generators that sell within RGGI to have sufficient 
allowances would likely run into the noted legal problems.  Implementing these changes would 
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RGGI Combined Electricity Sales Data (2005-2017) 
 
 
 CT DE ME MD MA NH NY RI VT Total Generation Difference 
2005 33095 12137 12363 68365 57228 11245 150148 8049 5883 358513 330200 -28313 
2006 31677 11555 12285 63173 55850 11094 142238 7799 5795 341466 320341 -21125 
2007 34129 11869 11860 65391 57139 11236 148178 8013 5864 353679 327064 -26615 
2008 30957 11749 11674 63326 55884 10977 144053 7819 5741 342180 312583 -29597 
2009 29716 11258 11283 62589 54359 10698 140043 7618 5497 333061 294624 -38437 
2010 30392 11606 11532 65335 57123 10890 144624 7799 5595 344896 307338 -37558 
2011 29859 11483 11415 63600 55570 10869 144047 7732 5550 340125 300036 -40089 
2012 29492 11519 11561 61814 55313 10870 143163 7708 5511 336951 293073 -43878 
2013 29825 11348 11855 61899 55265 11043 147895 7781 5589 342500 284592 -57908 
2014 29354 11338 12003 61684 54469 10944 147372 7643 5570 340377 284499 -55878 
2015 29476 11498 11888 61782 54621 10999 148914 7665 5521 342364 284646 -57718 
2016 28931 11258 11449 61354 53476 10905 147803 7524 5516 338216 279946 -58270 
2017 27994 10920 11407 59174 60058 10750 143755 7385 5392 336835 262782 -74053 
Change in 
Consumption 
-15.41% -10.03% -7.73% -13.44% 4.95% -4.40% -4.26% -8.25% -8.35% -6.05% -20.42% 161.55% 
Change in 
Generation 
-0.25% -14.79% -35.33% -35.89% -34.29% -27.75% -13.05% -13.25% -63.55% -20.42%   
 





RGGI Combined Electric Power Sector Generation Data (2005-2017) 
 
 
Year Coal Petroleum Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Renewables Other Total 
2005 73795 40474 82839 91711 34153 7228 3270 330200 
2006 73726 11160 94634 92977 36595 7966 3283 320341 
2007 75599 14132 100350 93780 31323 8677 3203 327064 
2008 69399 6995 94581 93435 35660 9277 3236 312583 
2009 53581 4453 92156 94266 36658 10474 3036 294624 
2010 53235 3148 108925 94225 33501 11312 2992 307338 
2011 38177 1833 116746 91375 37666 11254 2985 300036 
2012 25725 943 128650 90470 32398 11890 2997 293073 
2013 27444 2080 109549 96203 33046 13455 2815 284592 
2014 27549 4635 106544 94221 33807 14992 2751 284499 
2015 20322 4062 117568 91136 33172 15730 2656 284646 
2016 18202 1454 118985 89082 33088 16460 2675 279946 
2017 11030 1,313 104375 88811 36627 18016 2610 262782 
 -85.05% -96.76% 26.00% -3.16% 7.24% 149.25% -20.18% -20.42% 
 





RGGI Combined Renewable Electric Power Sector Generation Data (2010-2017) 
 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 % Change 
Wind 3212 3960 4594 5723 6310 6643 7084 7726 140.54% 
Biomass 8101 7272 7168 7445 8125 8303 8287 8442 4.21% 
Solar PV 1 23 130 297 559 787 1091 1851 185000.00% 
Total 11314 11255 11892 13465 14994 15733 16462 18019  
          
Percentage of Renewables 
Wind 28.39% 35.18% 38.63% 42.50% 42.08% 42.22% 43.03% 42.88%  
Biomass 71.60% 64.61% 60.28% 55.29% 54.19% 52.77% 50.34% 46.85%  
Solar PV 0.01% 0.20% 1.09% 2.21% 3.73% 5.00% 6.63% 10.27%  
 





Energy-Related CO2 Emissions Data (2005-2015) 
 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Percentage 
Connecticut 44.1 41 40.3 37.7 35.9 36.2 34.9 34.1 34.9 35.1 36.5 -17.23% 
Delaware 17.4 16.2 17.1 16.2 12 11.8 12.9 13.9 13.6 13.3 13.4 -22.99% 
Maine 23.1 21.3 21 19.1 18.4 18.1 17.6 15.9 16.6 16.6 16.8 -27.27% 
Maryland 83.5 77.2 77.5 73.8 70.5 69.1 64.4 59.9 59.2 61.3 59.5 -28.74% 
Massachusetts 84.5 76.5 79.9 76.7 70.3 71.8 68 61.7 65.6 63.7 65.6 -22.37% 
New Hampshire 21.3 19.4 19.2 18.7 17.1 16.6 16.2 14.6 14.3 14.9 15.1 -29.11% 
New York 211.6 193.2 199.6 190 173.9 174.5 164.9 161.5 162.7 170.1 168.3 -20.46% 
Rhode Island 11.2 10.5 11.1 10.7 11.3 11 11 10.5 10.2 10.6 10.9 -2.68% 
Vermont 6.8 6.7 6.5 5.9 6.2 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.8 5.9 6.1 -10.29% 
RGGI Total 503.5 462 472.2 448.8 415.6 415 395.7 377.6 382.9 391.5 392.2 -22.11% 
National Total 5,948.90 5,879.70 5,975.30 5,780.60 5,364.20 5,557.40 5,423.20 5,208.00 5,341.90 5,391.60 5,249.30 -11.76% 
Rest of Nation 5,445.40 5,417.70 5,503.10 5,331.80 4,948.60 5,142.40 5,027.50 4,830.40 4,959.00 5,000.10 4,857.10 -10.80% 
 








Source: RGGI, Inc. 2016., p.15  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
RGGI-Affected Units   159,287,880    139,924,128    145,789,425    129,374,761    105,958,243    116,053,938    101,456,734    92,212,271    86,517,389    88,360,436  
Non-RGGI Fossil Fuel-
Fired Units 
    10,309,984      10,134,399        8,443,421        4,662,824        4,263,698        5,355,842        5,401,761      6,459,299      8,193,802      8,974,623  
Non-Fossil Fuel-Fired 
Units 
      6,586,892      10,470,954      10,446,982      11,793,728      10,584,284      10,800,970      11,333,807    11,005,795    11,163,981    10,284,609  
Net Imports - From 
Ontario to NY 
         460,286           769,120           604,715        1,154,884           712,496           554,950           336,556         602,081         795,236         603,144  
Net Imports - From 
Quebec to NY & NE 
           30,081             39,607             39,262             41,725             67,723             37,339             47,363           66,408           54,159           48,617  
Net Imports - From New 
Brunswick to NE 
         714,298           547,053           455,316           736,564           968,535           406,202           410,324         297,690      1,186,296      1,127,493  
Net Imports - From non-
RGGI PJM to NY 
      4,460,362        5,484,024        5,801,823        5,999,390        4,381,845        6,656,944        5,952,203      4,287,069      4,822,624      4,534,250  
Net Imports - From non-
RGGI PJM to RGGI PJM 
    20,408,108      19,059,750      17,766,431      17,172,335      18,682,706      20,361,849      19,504,235    18,627,737    19,867,713    17,971,031  
